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Rental Market Stresses:  
Impacts of the Great Recession on Affordability and Multifamily Lending 
The Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Despite record-high vacancy rates and falling rents in some areas, the Great Recession 
did little to halt the long-term erosion of rental housing affordability. Indeed, conditions 
took a turn for the worse in the past decade when renters were squeezed by lower real 
incomes and rising rents and energy costs. Between 2001 and 2009, the share of renters 
paying more than 30 percent of their incomes for gross rent (contract rent plus tenant-
paid utilities) jumped from 41.2 percent to 48.7 percent. At the same time, the share of 
renters paying more than half their incomes for housing climbed from 20.7 percent to 
26.1 percent, with fully 2 percentage points of this increase occurring between 2007 and 
2009 alone. The growing share of cost-burdened renters is apparent in all of the 100 
largest metropolitan areas in the country.  
 
Yet even as the number of financially stressed renters has expanded, the supply of rental 
housing that is affordable and available to these households has shrunk. Between 2003 
and 2009, the number of very low-income renters (with incomes less than 50 percent of 
the area median) swelled from 16.3 million to 18.0 million while the number of rental 
units affordable at those income levels, not rented by higher-income households, and of 
adequate quality dropped from 12.0 million to 11.6 million. By 2009, there were only 64 
affordable, available, and adequate rental units for every 100 very low-income renter 
households. The situation for extremely low-income households (with incomes below 30 
percent of area median) is even more dire, with renters outnumbering affordable, 
available, and adequate units almost three to one. 
 
While rents did not fall nationally as measured by the Consumer Price Index, surveys of 
professionally managed apartments found widespread declines in rents in 2009 indicating 
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significant market weakness. By the fourth quarter of 2010 most markets had seen rents 
begin to rise again, but often at a rate that was close to the rise in overall prices. But in 
areas and market segments where rents continue to slide, the pressures on the affordable 
rental housing stock will only increase. With renter incomes at the bottom of the 
distribution failing to keep pace with increases in rental operating costs, this pressure is 
likely to continue in lower-rent market segments. When rents fall for units on the margins 
of financial viability—which many low-cost properties are—the quality of the housing 
ultimately erodes and vacancies climb. This is not a signal of added supply but rather that 
more of the affordable stock has become uninhabitable. Even modestly higher vacancies 
induce owners of low-end properties to withhold maintenance because they cannot cover 
its costs.  
 
For many multifamily property owners, the news is hardly better. Although vacancy rates 
have now retreated from record highs and rents and property values appear to be 
recovering, loan performance is still poor. As in the single-family market, low-cost, 
readily available financing fueled a boom in the multifamily rental sector during the early 
to mid-2000s. The recession then burst the bubble in multifamily property prices and 
exposed the weakness in underwriting, most notably among loans held in commercial 
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) and, to a lesser extent, in the portfolios of depository 
institutions. In comparison, loans held or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—
which accounted for nearly half of the expansion in multifamily credit—have performed 
relatively well, with delinquency rates only a fraction of those for CMBS loans. 
 
The surge in loan delinquencies has raised concerns about current and future losses on 
multifamily loan and securities portfolios. In addition to using looser underwriting 
standards and overly optimistic pro forma expectations, lenders originated many loans 
during the height of the boom with relatively short terms. While estimates vary, there is 
common agreement that a significant share of these loans will mature in the next few 
years. The risk is that recession-induced declines in net operating incomes and property 
values will make it difficult for property owners to refinance under today’s tighter 
underwriting guidelines. However, over the last year rental vacancy rates have fallen and 
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rent increases have started to take hold, which may ease the financial pressure on many 
properties.  
 
Participants in the multifamily market interviewed for this report in the first half of 2010 
indicated that the resolution process for troubled loans may well lead to extensions or 
modifications that give owners time to get back on their feet financially. The workout 
options are similar to those in the single-family mortgage market, ranging from 
forbearance and loan modifications to short sales and foreclosures if a change in 
ownership is warranted. An important distinction in the multifamily market is that owners 
of large properties do not want to jeopardize their relationships with lenders and are 
therefore motivated to seek resolutions short of foreclosure, including investing more 
capital in properties that—at least on paper—are financially under water.  
 
Moreover, even if the lender forecloses and brings in new management, lease-compliant 
renters face little risk of displacement. A federal law passed in May 2009 protects tenants 
of foreclosed or sold properties from rapid eviction, requiring new owners to provide at 
least 90 days notice to vacate and to honor the terms of any existing leases. Interviewees 
indicated that the eviction risk for tenants of large multifamily properties is particularly 
small because lenders and owners want to retain lease-compliant renters in order to 
maintain cash flows. They did, however, suggest that noncompliant tenants are more 
likely to be evicted if new management is brought in to run the property and reimposes 
normal property management practices. It should be noted that financially stressed renters 
lack the same options available to struggling homeowners under federal loan 
modification programs, yet are even more at risk of being unable to pay for housing 
because of their lower incomes and higher unemployment rates.  
 
But more than eviction risk, the critical issue for renters is that cash-strapped owners will 
be unable or unwilling to invest adequately in their properties. This is a particular 
concern for lower-grade properties, where rent pressures and lack of capital threaten the 
already limited stock of units affordable to the lowest-income households. 
 4 
 
Undermaintenance has implications not just for the physical condition of the housing but 
also for the quality of life of tenants and the surrounding communities.  
 
While interviewees expected multifamily loan delinquencies to rise further, they 
generally believed that the market had bottomed out. Indeed, with a large stock of capital 
available for equity and debt investment, investors and lenders are beginning to become 
active in the strongest market segments, typically the highest-quality properties in the 
largest metropolitan areas. At the same time, the financing environments for less 
attractive multifamily properties and for those located outside of large markets will likely 
remain difficult.  
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2. Deteriorating Rental Affordability 
 
Rental affordability has not improved in the wake of the financial crisis. Indeed, renter 
incomes have fallen more than housing costs, leaving more renters with housing cost 
burdens than before the recession. Large majorities of lowest-income renters pay more 
than half of their meager incomes for housing. While not as severe, rent burdens have 
also risen sharply among renters toward the middle of the income distribution.  
 
The affordability crisis has now spread to virtually all of the 100 largest metropolitan 
areas in the country. Moreover, the supply gap—the difference between what low-income 
households can afford to pay for rent and the number of rental units affordable and 
available at those levels—continues to widen.  
 
Falling Incomes, Rising Rents and Energy Costs 
Affordability has eroded over the years as renter income growth has lagged increases in 
contract rents (the amount paid each month to the property owner exclusive of any utility 
costs paid directly by the tenant) as well as in fuel and utility costs (figure 2-1). Since 
1980, median household income among renters has generally risen during periods of 
economic expansion, but then given back all of these gains during subsequent recessions. 
Following the 2001 downturn, however, real renter incomes did not rebound at all but 
instead dropped below their 1980 level.1
 
 Over this time the decline in renter incomes was 
widespread, affecting all race/ethnicity groups and household types (figure 2-2). 
Meanwhile, contract rents have risen in real terms by more than 16 percent since 1980. 
After climbing for much of that decade, contract rents entered a period of sustained 
decline through the mid-1990s. But with renter incomes falling even more sharply over 
this period, the gap between rents and incomes actually widened. From 1996 through 
                                               
1 One question of interest is whether the decline in renter incomes is simply an artifact of rising 
homeownership rates in recent years, with moves to homeownership siphoning off higher-income renters 
and reducing the median income among the remaining pool of renters. But the change in the level and 
distribution of income alone in 2000–9 would have reduced real median renter income by 8.3 percent, 
rather than the 11.1 percent that actually occurred. Thus, about three-quarters of the observed change in 
median renter income is due to falling real incomes and changes in the distribution of income over this 
period. Only about a quarter of the change reflects changes in ownership rates by income. 
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2003, rent increases consistently outpaced overall inflation, with real rents up 1.0 percent 
per year on average. Although real median renter income grew between 1995 and 2000, 
closing some of the gap with rents, income fell again after 2001. Although real rents also 
fell from 2004 through 2008, averaging just 0.2 percent annual increases, they jumped 
again in 2009 even as renter incomes fell.  
 
High fuel and utility costs have also contributed to deteriorating affordability over the last 
decade. For much of the 1980s and 1990s, falling real energy costs helped to close the 
gap between rent and income growth, dropping to 84 percent of their 1980 level in 1999. 
Fuel and utility costs then shot up to 112 percent of their 1980 level in 2008. Although 
the recession dampened further increases, energy prices remain elevated. In real terms, 
household fuel and utility costs were up 27.1 percent from 1999 to 2010—3.7 times the 
increase in rents. 
 
In 2001, tenant-paid utilities accounted for 17.8 percent of gross rents. By 2009, this 
share was 20.1 percent. While all renters saw increases, the lowest-income households 
were especially hard hit (figure 2-3). For renters in the bottom income quintile, energy 
costs as a share of gross rent climbed 3.3 percentage points, from 22.6 percent to 25.8 
percent. The middle income groups saw the smallest increases, with only a 1.1 percentage 
point increase for renters in the middle income quintile. The larger relative impact of 
utility costs on lower-income renters reflects the fact that these tenants generally pay 
lower rents, and also that lower-rent units are often in older, less energy-efficient 
buildings. Nevertheless, renters with low incomes are clearly under greater pressure from 
rising energy costs than renters with higher incomes. 
 
Updates to Traditional Affordability Measures 
In their seminal study of rental housing, Quigley and Raphael (2004) examined changes 
in three common measures of affordability from 1960 to 2000: (1) median rent-to-income 
ratio, (2) share of renters paying more than 30 percent of income for rent, and (3) share of 
occupied rental units with rents below 30 percent of median renter income. Each of these 
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measures has advantages and disadvantages that relate primarily to the availability of data 
as well as their sensitivity to changes in the distribution of incomes or rents.2
 
  
Extending the Quigley–Raphael analysis to 2000–9, it is clear that the long-term 
deterioration in rental affordability accelerated in the last decade (figure 2-4).3
 
 This 
acceleration was apparent even before the onset of the recession. The median rent-to-
income ratio shows the smallest rise, from 19 percent in 1960 to 30 percent in 2009. This 
modest increase is not surprising given that the ratio only captures changes in the middle 
of the renter distribution. In contrast, the share of renters paying more than 30 percent of 
income for rent more than doubled over the same period, from 23 percent to 50 percent. 
The share of units with rents below 30 percent of median renter income also declined 
sharply from 83 percent in 1960 to 43 percent in 2009.  
All three measures identify the 1970s and 2000s as decades when affordability fell 
significantly. The median rent-to-income ratio rose by 5 percentage points during the 
1970s and then by another 4 percentage points between 2000 and 2009. Together these 
two increases account for 82 percent of the total rise in the ratio over the past half-
century. Similarly, the share of units affordable at 30 percent of median renter income 
plunged by 14 percentage points in the 1970s and another 19 percentage points in the 
2000s. This measure also posted a 7 percentage point decline in the 1980s.  
 
Meanwhile, the share of cost-burdened renters—that is, paying more than 30 percent of 
income for housing—has risen more or less steadily from decade to decade, with 
increases of 8 percentage points in the 1970s and 10 percentage points in the 2000s. Since 
this measure of cost burdens encompasses changes in the circumstances for all renters 
rather than just the median renter, it is the most sensitive gauge of changes in 
affordability over time.  
                                               
2 See appendix B for a discussion of the evolution of affordability measures using the 30 percent of income 
standard. 
3 This analysis uses the American Community Survey, which has income and housing cost questions that 
are consistent with the decennial census. While the values for 2000 do not exactly match those reported by 
Quigley and Raphael, the estimates are similar. As in the original calculations, the analysis excludes no 
cash-rent households; includes zero- and negative-income households; and defines income quintiles using 
all households (owners and renters). 
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In 1960, most lowest-income renters were already paying well over 30 percent of income 
for housing. Even so, the share of cost-burdened renters in the bottom quintile was up to 
82 percent in 2009 (figure 2-5). Even more telling for this group, the median renter in the 
bottom income quintile spent 47 percent of income for housing in 1960 and 64 percent in 
2009.4
 
  
But rent burdens are not just a problem for the poorest households. Indeed, affordability 
challenges for households in the lower-middle income quintile have increased the most 
over the past 50 years. The share of renters in this group paying more than 30 percent of 
income for housing jumped from 21 percent in 1960 to 58 percent in 2009. The increase 
in the share of cost-burdened renters in the middle income quintile was also noteworthy, 
up nearly sixfold from 4 percent to 23 percent. 
 
Quigley and Raphael decomposed the third measure of affordability—the share of units 
affordable at 30 percent of median renter income—into changes in rent and changes in 
renter incomes to analyze the contribution of each. Updating their analysis indicates that 
while rents rose fairly consistently over the entire period, renter income growth offset 
much of these increases in the 1960s and 1990s (figure 2-6). In the 1980s, however, 
renter income growth failed to match the increase in rents, leading to moderate declines 
in the affordability measure. And in the 1970s and the 2000s, renter incomes fell 
significantly while rents climbed, pushing this affordability measure down sharply. In 
those two decades, rising rents and falling incomes thus contributed about equally to the 
overall decline in rental housing affordability.  
 
Although renter cost pressures might be expected to ease in the wake of the recession, the 
economic downturn has instead made matters worse. American Community Survey data 
show that the median rent-to-income ratio for all renters climbed from 26.9 percent in 
                                               
4 It should be noted that income measures may overstate the rental burdens these households face because 
they exclude noncash sources such as food stamps and Medicaid, as well as money received from the 
earned income tax credit. Moreover, households may understate the amount of income received in the 
survey. Even making allowances for somewhat higher incomes, however, the situation for the lowest-
income renters is clearly dire. 
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2001 to 29.3 percent in 2007, and again to 30.3 percent in 2009.5
 
 Over those same 
intervals, the share of renters paying more than 30 percent of income for gross rent rose 
from 41.2 percent to 46.3 percent, and then to 48.7 percent. Moreover, the share of 
severely cost-burdened renters (paying more than half their incomes for rent) jumped 
from 20.7 percent in 2001 to 24.1 percent in 2007, and then another two percentage 
points to 26.1 percent in 2009.  
When only low-income renters are considered, the affordability challenges are even more 
alarming. The median ratio of gross rent to income among bottom-quintile households 
was 63.6 percent in 2009, and the share of these households paying more than half of 
their incomes for rent and utilities was 61.4 percent. The situation is worse when using 
other common measures of low income. For example, the rent-to-income ratio for renters 
below the federal poverty level was 71.0 percent in 2009.6
 
  
Growth of Worst Case Needs During the Recession 
Another common measure of housing affordability is the share of renters facing “worst 
case needs.” The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) defines these 
households in its biennial report to Congress as renters that are unassisted, earn less than 
50 percent of local area median income (AMI), and pay more than 50 percent of income 
for housing and/or live in severely inadequate conditions (Steffen et al. 2011).7
                                               
5 In these calculations noncash renters are assumed to be unburdened, while renters with zero or negative 
incomes are assumed to be severely burdened. 
 The 
report refers to renters with incomes below 50 percent of AMI as very low income (VLI) 
and renters with incomes below 30 percent of AMI as extremely low income (ELI). The 
6 Following a directive of the Office of Management and Budget, the Census Bureau uses a set of money 
income thresholds that vary by family size and composition to determine who is in poverty. If a family’s 
total income is less than the family’s threshold, then that family and every individual in it is considered in 
poverty. The official poverty thresholds do not vary geographically, but they are updated for inflation using 
the Consumer Price Index. The official poverty definition uses money income before taxes and does not 
include capital gains or noncash benefits (such as public housing, Medicaid, and food stamps). 
7 While by definition worst case needs households do not include those receiving rental assistance, in the 
discussion that follows we do describe the cost burdens and housing adequacy situation of assisted renters 
as well. 
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ELI category corresponds roughly with renters with incomes below the federal poverty 
level.8
 
  
The following analysis draws on HUD’s worst case needs methodology.9
 
 As the 
recession took hold, the number of worst case needs households jumped from 6.2 million 
in 2007 to 7.8 million in 2009. The vast majority of these renters were severely cost 
burdened but lived in adequate housing. Only 4 percent had both severe cost burdens and 
structurally inadequate units, while another 2 percent lived in inadequate housing but 
were not severely cost burdened. 
Some 58 percent of unassisted VLI households faced worst case needs in 2009 (figure 2-
7). The problem is even more widespread among unassisted ELI renters, affecting more 
than four-fifths of these households. Devoting such a huge fraction of their meager 
incomes to housing leaves these renters with little left to pay for the basic necessities of 
life, including food, clothing, and health care. 
 
And receiving assistance does not guarantee relief from housing cost burdens. About one 
in four VLI households receive some form of rental assistance.10
                                               
8 These income categories are defined in terms of HUD-adjusted local area median family incomes, with 
the areas corresponding to either specific metropolitan areas or to nonmetropolitan areas of states. Income 
levels are determined with a lag and may not fully track rapid changes in the economy. For example, the 
number of households with incomes below 50 percent of AMI increased by 3.1 million between 2007 and 
2009, while the number with incomes above 50 percent of AMI decreased by 1.8 million.  
 But even within this 
group, rising rent and utility costs have absorbed increasing shares of income. In part, this 
9 This analysis yields different numbers and shares of worst case needs renters than HUD because of 
differences in some of the definitions used. For consistency with other Joint Center reports, the American 
Housing Survey (AHS) is reweighted to match American Community Survey totals by household type and 
age and race/ethnicity of householders. Noncash renters are assumed to be unburdened, while households 
with zero or negative incomes are assumed to be severely burdened. Assisted renters in this analysis 
reported that they lived in public housing; had housing vouchers; were in a federal, state, or local 
government housing program; were assigned to their housing units; or were required to certify income to 
determine their rent. This definition is more inclusive than the one used by HUD in its Worst Case Needs 
report. 
10 Information on the number of federally subsidized households is fragmentary and inconsistent. Some 
households benefit from multiple programs (e.g., have vouchers and live in tax credit units). As a result, 
simply adding the number of units subsidized under each program results in double counting. Household 
surveys such as the AHS also provide unreliable information because many respondents do not accurately 
report whether they benefit from subsidies and, if so, what type. Moreover, AHS survey questions on rental 
assistance changed slightly between 2005 and 2007, resulting in a drop in the number of self-identified 
assisted renters. 
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reflects a shift in rental assistance from public housing and project-based subsidies 
(which generally limit tenant-paid costs to no more than 30 percent of household income) 
to vouchers and tax credits (which often leave housing costs substantially above the 30-
percent standard).  
 
In fact, a majority (57 percent) of all assisted renter households paid more than 30 percent 
of their incomes for rent in 2007, and nearly a third (31 percent) paid more than 50 
percent. In the aftermath of the Great Recession, the shares of assisted renters facing 
these burdens hit 59 percent and 33 percent in 2009. Among ELI assisted renters alone, 
the share paying more than 30 percent of income for housing was 74 percent in 2009 and 
the share paying more than half of income was 48 percent.  
 
While the worst case needs concept allows for the possibility that renters may trade off 
affordability against structural adequacy, the incidence of severely inadequate housing is 
low and generally declined even during the recession. Among unassisted VLI renters, 
only 3.4 percent lived in severely inadequate units in 2009, down from 3.6 percent in 
2007. When ELI renters are considered, the incidence of severe structural inadequacies is 
only slightly higher at 4.1 percent in 2009, down from 4.2 percent in 2007. Assisted 
renters face similar degrees of severe inadequacy, with 3.4 percent of assisted VLI renters 
living in inadequate housing in 2009, virtually unchanged from 2007, while among ELI 
assisted renters the share rose modestly from 3.3 percent in 2007 to 3.4 percent in 2009.  
Despite continuing growth in the number of renters facing affordability challenges, direct 
federal spending on rental assistance has dwindled. Indeed, the number of households 
assisted by HUD programs stalled in the mid-1990s (figure 2-8). At that point, 
construction of non-HUD low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) units expanded 
dramatically, peaking at more than 80,000 in 2003. But tax credit units offer a shallower 
rent subsidy than earlier forms of project-based rental assistance. Moreover, construction 
on many LIHTC units was delayed or stopped in 2009 when investor demand collapsed 
in the wake of the financial crisis.  
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Metropolitan-Level Trends  
The deterioration in rental affordability is evident in all 100 of the nation’s largest 
metropolitan areas (figure 2-9). Between 2000 and 2009, the share of renters paying more 
than 50 percent of income for housing rose in all 100 areas, as did the share paying more 
than 30 percent. The magnitude of the increases in severe burden share was also 
noteworthy, averaging 8.1 percentage points. In 90 of these markets, shares of severely 
cost-burdened renters were up by at least 5.4 percentage points. Shares of moderately 
burdened renters rose even more, with an average increase of 11.7 percentage points. 
Some 90 percent of metro areas posted increases of at least 7.7 percentage points.  
 
Consistent with the national measures, the metro-level shares of cost-burdened renters are 
high. In 2009, the average share of renters with moderate cost burdens in the 100 largest 
metros was 50.1 percent, and the average share with severe burdens was 25.8 percent. 
These shares do, however, vary widely across markets. The share of moderately cost-
burdened renters ranged from a low of 37.7 percent to a high of 62.3 percent, while the 
share of severely cost-burdened renters ranged from 17.7 percent to 34.9 percent. Even 
so, the shares of burdened renters in roughly two-thirds of the 100 largest markets fall 
within fairly narrow bands. Within these bands the range in share for renters paying more 
than 30 percent of income for housing is 45.8 to 55.2 percent, while that for renters 
paying more than 50 percent is 22.7 to 29.4 percent. 
 
Metro-level patterns in these measures are hardly intuitive. Among the areas with the 10 
lowest shares of severely cost-burdened renters are several lower-cost markets such as 
Wichita, Kansas, El Paso, Texas, and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. But this list also includes 
such high-cost areas as Washington, D.C., and Worcester, Massachusetts. Similarly, the 
areas with the 10 highest shares of severely cost-burdened renters include high-cost 
markets such as Miami, Florida, and Stockton, California, but also the low-cost areas of 
McAllen, Texas, and Knoxville, Tennessee. Meanwhile, some of the highest housing cost 
areas in the country—including New York, New York, and Honolulu, Hawaii—are in the 
middle of the distribution, with rental cost burdens comparable to those in such low-cost 
areas as Little Rock, Arkansas, and Dayton, Ohio.  
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There is no simple explanation for these anomalies. The variation across markets reflects 
differences in both housing costs and renter incomes. In some areas, high rents are offset 
by the presence of larger shares of higher-income renters due, for example, to lower 
homeownership rates. In other areas, housing costs may be low but renter incomes may 
be even lower. As a result, renter affordability problems are not confined to a few high-
cost, densely populated coastal areas. 
 
What is common across all metropolitan markets is that low-income renters consistently 
pay large shares of their incomes for housing. On average, 83.7 percent of renters in the 
lowest income quintile had moderate cost burdens in 2009, while 60.7 percent had severe 
burdens. At best, the share of renters paying more than half of their incomes for housing 
in all 100 metros was 42.3 percent. In 95 of these markets, more than 50 percent of 
renters in the lowest quintile faced severe cost burdens.  
 
The Growing Supply Gap 
The growing mismatch between the cost of rental units and renter incomes is yet another 
factor contributing to worsening affordability. HUD and the National Low Income 
Housing Coalition (NLIHC) have both used the concept of the “supply gap” to estimate 
the extent of this problem (Nelson et al. 2004; Steffen et al. 2011). While similar to the 
share of units affordable at 30 percent of median renter income, the supply gap accounts 
for the fact that higher-income renters often occupy low-cost rental housing.  
 
HUD and NLIHC analyses first estimate the number of occupied and vacant rental units 
that would be affordable to households of various incomes, and then subtract the number 
of these units that are occupied by higher-income households and therefore unavailable. 
HUD further refines the calculation by eliminating structurally inadequate units. The 
affordable, available, and adequate stock is then compared with the number of 
households in each income category to determine the supply–demand gap.  
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The HUD and NLIHC analyses use income and rent categories defined in relation to local 
area median family income, taking into account both the size of households and the 
number of bedrooms in rental units. This approach reflects provisions defining eligibility 
and benefits under federal subsidy programs; it also recognizes that simply comparing 
household incomes and rents would otherwise imply that an efficiency apartment with a 
rent of $300 per month would affordably meet the needs of a six-person household with 
income of $1,000 per month.  
 
Using data from the American Housing Survey (AHS), it is clear that the supply gap has 
grown significantly in recent years.11
 
 For example, there were 10.4 million ELI renters in 
2009. At the time, 6.2 million occupied units had gross rents (adjusted for number of 
bedrooms) that would have been affordable to these households. Another 370,000 vacant 
units would also have been affordable assuming that utility costs add 15 percent to asking 
rents. In total, roughly 6.6 million occupied or vacant units were affordable to ELI renters 
in 2009. 
But of these 6.6 million units, 2.8 million were occupied by households with higher 
incomes and were therefore unavailable. Of the 3.7 million occupied or vacant units that 
were affordable and available to ELI renters in 2009, 106,000 were severely inadequate. 
Subtracting the units with known deficiencies leaves about 3.6 million units. The number 
of affordable, available, and adequate rentals therefore totaled little more a third of the 
number of ELI renter households.12
 
  
Using this approach, it is possible to estimate the ratio of the 2009 rental stock to VLI and 
ELI renters in each of three categories (affordable; affordable and available; affordable, 
available, and adequate). A supply gap exists when the ratio is less than one, indicating 
                                               
11 The calculations assume that gross rents for vacant units are 1.15 times the asking rents. Noncash renters 
are not included in the affordability calculations for occupied rentals. Vacant units are considered adequate 
if they have full plumbing. Households with zero or negative income are included in the analysis. AMI 
categories are based on the values for local median income reported in the AHS public use microdata. Units 
rented but not yet occupied are not included.  
12 Although ELI households occupied 3.7 million “affordable” units, many of these renters paid more than 
30 percent of their incomes for housing, underscoring the problem of estimating the number of affordable 
units based on an upper limit of an income category. 
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that there are more households than rentals in that category. In general, supply gaps are 
evident only for renters making up to 50 percent of AMI. For those households, the gap is 
relatively small, with the ratio of units to renters of 0.99 (figure 2-10). But eliminating the 
number of affordable units rented by higher-income households brings the ratio down to 
just 0.66. Thus, for households making less than half of AMI, the supply gap largely 
reflects the presence of higher-income households in many of the units they can afford.  
 
For renters with incomes of up to 30 percent of AMI, the ratio between the number of 
renters and affordable units is 0.63. For this group, the increase in the supply gap because 
higher-income households occupy the units is smaller but still notable, lowering the ratio 
to 0.36. For both groups of households, structural inadequacy had only a minor impact on 
the supply gap.  
 
With the rising cost of rental housing as well as increased competition for affordable 
units, the supply gap widened over much of the past decade. Between 2003 and 2009, the 
number of VLI renters rose from 16.3 million to 18.0 million while the number of 
affordable and available units shrank from 12.4 million to 11.9 million (figure 2-11). At 
the same time, the number of ELI renters jumped from 9.4 million to 10.4 million, and 
the number of affordable and available units dropped from 4.0 million to 3.7 million. As 
a result, the ratio of affordable and available units to renters fell from 0.76 to 0.66 for 
VLI renters and from 0.42 to 0.36 for ELI renters.  
 
A key factor in the growing rental affordability crisis is thus insufficient supply of 
housing that is affordable and available to low-income households. As the next section 
describes, the turmoil in rental markets in the wake of the Great Recession put 
multifamily property owners under great financial strain, further threatening the market’s 
ability to supply affordable units. However, with declining vacancies and strengthening 
rents since early 2010, the financial condition of rental properties may be improving.  
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3. Challenges in the Multifamily Sector 
 
Despite recent improvements in rental market conditions, key segments of the 
multifamily finance market remain under stress. For much of the 2000s, debt financing 
was liberally available with looser underwriting based on rosy assumptions about both 
net operating income (NOI) and property values.13
 
 With the onset of the recession, 
vacancy rates soared, rent growth stalled, and property values plunged, placing many 
owners under significant financial pressure. Indeed, delinquency rates for loans in 
commercial mortgage backed securities exceed those in the single-family market and 
have yet to show any notable decline even as other market indicators improve.  
The following section examines conditions in multifamily finance markets for large Class 
A or B properties, generally with 30 or more units but more commonly 50 or more units. 
The findings presented here draw upon interviews with several industry experts—
including holders of large multifamily investment portfolios, housing market analysts, 
and multifamily policy advisors—conducted in the first half of 2010. The interviews 
highlight the challenge that multifamily borrowers face in refinancing their loans in the 
next several years and what the resolution process might mean for tenants and their 
communities.  
 
The Multifamily Boom in Property Values and Financing 
The surge in large multifamily property values over the past decade was even more 
dramatic than in single-family home prices. Moody’s Commercial Property Price Index 
for apartment buildings, based on repeat sales of properties worth at least $2.5 million, 
surged by 95 percent from the end of 2000 to a peak in the first quarter of 2007 (figure 3-
1). By comparison, the S&P/Case-Shiller Price Index for single-family homes climbed 76 
percent between the end of 2000 and its peak in mid-2006. 
 
                                               
13 Net operating income is rental receipts less operating costs aside from debt service. 
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The boom in multifamily property values was 
driven by several factors. Capitalization rates 
used to derive property valuations based on net 
operating income were falling during the early 
years of the decade, reflecting generally lower 
expected returns on capital and a narrowing of 
credit risk spreads.14
 
 With lower capitalization 
rates, the same net operating income supported 
higher property valuations.  
In addition, multifamily rental properties were 
attractive candidates for conversion to 
condominiums to take advantage of soaring 
single-family home prices. In many cases, units 
in high-end properties were worth more when 
sold as condos than when rented as apartments 
(see text box for property classifications). Later 
in the boom, this belief spread to middle-market 
apartments as well. Properties began to change 
hands not on the basis of their fundamental 
value as rental housing, but of their speculative 
value when converted to homeownership. This 
put upward pressure on appraisals, and the 
potential for large short-term profits attracted 
huge amounts of capital.  
 
With these factors fueling asset inflation, demand for mortgage finance surged. Ample 
liquidity existed to meet rising demand at attractive interest rates. Indeed, the availability 
                                               
14 Capitalization rates, or “cap” rates, is the ratio of first-year NOI to the property acquisition price. 
Capitalization rates are inferred by appraisers and market analysts who examine actual sales. Cap rates 
from recent sales are then used to estimate the price at which similar properties might be expected to sell. 
Generally, capitalization rates fall with interest rates as a given NOI will support greater debt levels. Cap 
rates will also be lower if NOI is expected to increase over time, again supporting higher debt levels. 
Multifamily Property Classifications 
Multifamily industry participants refer to 
market-rate rental properties according to 
class A, B, or C. While these terms have 
no rigorous industrywide definitions, the 
following describes common distinctions 
among the three property classes.  
Class A, usually synonymous with 
“investment grade,” generally refers to 
properties that are new (no more than 10 
years old), located in a primary market 
(population of at least 2 million), include 
200 units or more, and have finish quality 
that represents the top of their markets. 
Class B generally refers to properties that 
are somewhat older than class A 
properties, located in secondary market 
areas (with populations of 500,000 to 2 
million), include 100–200 units, and/or 
may have typical rather than top-of-market 
finish quality.  
Class C generally refers to properties that 
have one or more of the following flaws: 
more than 20 years old; located in a 
tertiary market (population below 
500,000), a weak secondary market, or a 
submarket generally considered 
undesirable for investment; and finish 
quality reflecting more than 20-year-old 
standards.  
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of low interest rates also helped to push up asset values given that the same cash flow 
would support higher debt levels.  
 
After remaining essentially flat from 1975 until 1998, multifamily lending began to climb 
steadily (figure 3-2). The amount of outstanding debt increased from the end of 1998 
until the end of 2008 by an average of $42 billion annually, with the total amount nearly 
doubling over this period in real terms.  
 
Over this same period, federal and government-sponsored agencies (GSEs) accounted for 
48 percent of the net increase in outstanding debt (figure 3-3).15
 
 Indeed, the GSE share of 
the market swelled from 19 percent to 33 percent. By the end of 2008 commercial banks 
were roughly twice as important as CMBS (categorized as the more generic “asset-
backed securities” in the Flow of Funds data) in adding to the stock of multifamily debt, 
accounting for more than a third of the increase. On net, the other principal sources of 
multifamily loans—including savings institutions, state and local governments, and life 
insurance companies—saw little real change in the volume of their outstanding 
multifamily loans.  
After the economy soured in 2008, the GSEs became an even more important presence in 
the market. According to the Federal Reserve’s flow of funds estimates, the volume of 
outstanding multifamily loans held or guaranteed by the GSEs increased by $35 billion in 
real terms while the volume for all other financing sources combined dropped by $20 
billion between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the fourth quarter of 2010.  
 
Recession Fallout 
The onset of the Great Recession brought the multifamily boom in property values to an 
abrupt end. One of the most obvious indicators of market distress was the jump in 
vacancy rates for most types of properties. After edging up in 2008, the overall rental 
vacancy rate jumped to 10.6 percent in 2009—the highest level recorded since the Census 
                                               
15 Federal agency refers to Ginnie Mae while government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) include Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks.  
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Bureau began tracking this information more than 50 years ago. The increase in 
vacancies was concentrated in properties with at least five units, with the rate for 
buildings with five to nine units reaching 11.4 percent and the rate for buildings with 10 
or more units, 12.7 percent (figure 3-4). In contrast, vacancy rates for single-family 
rentals and two- to four-unit buildings held at near-record levels of 9.8 percent and 9.3 
percent.  
 
The rise in rental vacancy rates is somewhat surprising given the modest number of 
multifamily housing starts—which includes most units intended for the rental market—
over the last decade. Between 2007 and 2008, multifamily starts remained near 300,000 
units a year, well below 1970s and 1980s peaks. Indeed, large shares of multifamily 
housing completed in 2005–8 were either aimed at the owner market (37 percent) or 
supported by the low-income housing tax credit (25 percent). In short, the volume of 
market-rate multifamily construction intended for the rental market in the years leading 
up to the recession could hardly be called excessive when it is considered that the rental 
housing supply normally lost to disasters, demolitions, and abandonment is on the order 
of 100,000 units per year. 
 
When the recession hit, multifamily housing starts declined sharply even as the crisis in 
homeownership markets boosted demand for rentals. Housing Vacancy Survey (HVS) 
data show that the average annual increase in the number of renters exceeded 675,000 
from 2005 through 2010. Nevertheless, rental vacancy rates rose as many previously 
owner-occupied units shifted into the rental market. According to the AHS, the number 
of renters living in single-family homes increased by 1.7 million between 2005 and 2009. 
In contrast, there was a net decline in single-family renters in the four years prior to 2005.  
 
But while the number of single-family units in the rental stock has increased, the vacancy 
rate in this market segment has not. Instead, the changing composition of renter 
households has apparently supported stronger demand for single-family units at the 
expense of larger multifamily properties.  
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The recession also had a negative effect on rents. Although the consumer price index did 
not show a decline in contract rents, a variety of evidence indicates that rents and net 
operating incomes for investment-grade multifamily properties did in fact fall during the 
recession. For instance, according to data collected by MPF Research nominal rents for a 
sample of large investment-grade properties fell an estimated 4.1 percent nationally from 
the fourth quarter of 2008 to the fourth quarter of 2009.  
 
With this deterioration in market conditions, along with rising capitalization rates, 
multifamily property values plummeted as the recession unfolded. Moody’s index of 
multifamily values declined by 40 percent from its peak at the start of 2007 to a trough in 
the third quarter of 2009. This drop is even sharper than that in single-family prices, with 
the Case-Shiller index showing a 32 percent peak-to-trough decline.  
 
But there are signs that the worst may be over, at least for large multifamily properties. 
Vacancy rates in the last quarter of 2010 were down 1.3 percentage points overall from 
the 2009 level and 2.2 percentage points among structures with 10 or more units. Rents in 
large apartment buildings were also back on the rise, with MPF Research reporting a 2.3 
percent year-over-year increase in nominal rents in the fourth quarter of 2010. Moody’s 
index also shows a 20 percent rebound in large multifamily property values from a third-
quarter 2009 low to the end of 2010. It should be noted, however, that property values 
were still 28 percent below peak levels. In addition, it is unclear whether the recovery 
extends to other multifamily segments.  
 
Rental market conditions vary considerably across metropolitan markets. According to 
HVS data, from the end of 2006 to the end of 2010 vacancy rates rose in 37 of the 
nation’s largest 74 metro areas, with the sharpest increases in some of the most overbuilt 
markets. Orlando, Florida, tops the chart with a surge in vacancy rates from 6.8 percent to 
23.6 percent over this period. Increases in Dayton, Ohio (11.1 percentage points), 
Memphis, Tennessee (8.5 percentage points), Bridgeport, Connecticut (7.2 percentage 
points), and Phoenix, Arizona (7.2 percentage points) were also substantial. At the same 
time, vacancy rates have fallen in many areas, including the Midwestern markets of 
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Grand Rapids, Michigan (-20.9 percentage points), and Indianapolis, Indiana (-11.1 
percentage points), as well as some markets in the South and the West, such as 
Birmingham, Alabama (-12.3 percentage points), and Sacramento, California (-5.2 
percentage points). 
 
Multifamily Loan Performance  
With rising vacancies, falling rents in many segments, and plunging property values, 
delinquency rates for multifamily loans began to rise in 2008 and then turned up more 
sharply in 2009. Loan performance, however, varies considerably by class of investor. 
The share of multifamily loans held in private mortgage-backed securities that were 60 or 
more days delinquent or in some stage of foreclosure climbed to 7.3 percent at the end of 
2009 and to 14.0 percent at the end of 2010 (figure 3-5). Meanwhile, the 90-day 
delinquency rate for multifamily loans held by banks and thrifts rose from 1.8 percent at 
the end of 2008 to a peak of 4.7 percent in the third quarter of 2010 before easing.  
 
Delinquency rates for multifamily loans held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have 
increased much more modestly. The share of Fannie Mae loans that were 60 or more days 
delinquent or in foreclosure rose from less than 0.10 percent at the start of 2008 to 0.80 
percent in the second quarter of 2010. The increase for Freddie Mac loans was even 
smaller, from 0.04 percent to 0.28 percent. While these gains are large in percentage 
terms, overall delinquency rates for GSE loans are only a fraction of those for 
multifamily CMBS.  
 
Interviews with market participants highlighted several factors contributing to the poor 
performance of multifamily loans. During the lending boom of the early and mid-2000s, 
lenders competed vigorously in what one interviewee called a “feeding frenzy.” Not only 
were loans available with unusually attractive debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs) and 
loan-to-value ratios (LTVs), but lenders often made aggressive assumptions about future 
net operating income growth, which supported more lenient DSCRs and LTVs at 
origination (see text box for detailed definition of these terms). Individuals interviewed 
for this report were most familiar with underwriting standards for loans destined for 
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CMBS, but they noted that, given their relatively high 
delinquency rates, banks were also likely to have 
deviated from traditional underwriting practices during 
this period. 
 
The structure of CMBS helped to drive demand for 
multifamily loans. A CMBS pool consists of hundreds 
of loans on office buildings, shopping centers, 
industrial buildings, hotels, and apartments. With such 
a diversified pool, properties that perform better than 
anticipated can offset properties that perform worse 
than anticipated. In addition, CMBS issuers can divide 
the cash flows from the pool into senior tranches (with 
first call on cash flows), middle tranches (with second 
call on cash flow, having higher risk and higher 
potential returns), and noninvestment-grade tranches 
(with very high risk but also potential for very high 
profits).  
 
The senior tranches, which form the bulk of CMBS 
securities, receive investment-grade ratings and can 
thus be readily sold. Some of the middle tranches may 
be sold as well. The noninvestment-grade or junk 
tranches, while highly risky and not readily saleable, 
still offer the potential for truly spectacular returns. In 
addition, these tranches were usually allocated enough 
current cash flow to provide an attractive yield. As one 
interviewee put it, “If you bought the toxic waste, you 
still probably came out OK as long as the deal held 
together for four or five years.”  
 
Debt Service Coverage Ratio 
(DSCR) 
The DSCR is the ratio of net operating 
income to mortgage debt service. Net 
operating income is rental receipts less 
operating costs aside from debt 
service. Debt service includes principal 
payments, interest payments, and any 
credit enhancement costs such as 
FHA mortgage insurance premiums or 
guarantee fees.  
DSCRs are most commonly expressed 
as a fraction (e.g.,1.20), but 
sometimes as a percentage (120%). 
The more that the DSCR exceeds 1.00 
or 100%, the greater the likelihood that 
net operating income will fail to 
achieve expected levels. For 
multifamily properties, loans with 
DSCRs of 1.20 and above are 
commonly regarded as relatively low 
risk; those with DSCRs below 1.10 are 
at moderate risk; and those with 
DSCRs below 1.00 are troubled, 
because net operating income is 
inadequate to cover the monthly 
mortgage payment. During the lending 
boom, initial DSCRs of less than 1.20 
were sometimes accepted under the 
assumption that future growth in NOI 
would raise the ratio over time. 
Loan-to-Value Ratio (LTV) 
The loan-to-value ratio is the ratio of 
loan amount to property value. If the 
lender has to foreclose on a property, 
the proceeds from the sale will be 
used to meet the outstanding 
mortgage obligation. Lower LTVs 
provide greater ability to meet the 
transaction costs of the sale and to 
insure against a drop in property value. 
For multifamily buildings, LTVs at or 
below 75% are usually considered 
relatively low risk; between 75% and 
85% as moderate to high risk; and 
above 85% as posing high risk of 
potential loss to the lender. During the 
boom, initial LTVs of more than 75% 
were sometimes accepted under the 
assumption that future increases in 
property values would increase the 
LTVs.  
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Multifamily loans were popular with CMBS issuers and ratings agencies because their 
cash flows are much more stable and predictable than those from office buildings, 
shopping centers, hotels, and industrial buildings. As a result, issuers had powerful 
incentives to make multifamily loans because they added so much value to the CMBS 
pool. The result was a surge in multifamily loans with high LTVs and low DSCRs on 
decidedly below-average properties. In the CMBS world, borrowers with reasonable 
prospects of making payments for at least the first four to five years were highly sought 
after, with almost no regard for their ability to repay the debt in the long term.  
 
This aggressive underwriting put many properties in a tenuous financial position even 
before the recession. When the economy stalled, changes in rents turned negative on 
some properties, concessions (for example, a rent-free period at the beginning of the 
lease) were widespread, and vacancy rates mushroomed. At the same time, operating 
expenses continued to rise with inflation (or more commonly, had been underestimated 
by the lender and borrower). As a result, NOI dropped or, for new properties, was lower 
than predicted. With loan underwriting providing little margin for error, these financial 
challenges left owners unable to meet their debt service requirements. Several borrowing 
scenarios that were common during the period of relaxed underwriting, such as loans 
made in anticipation of converting the apartments to condominiums or the repositioning 
of a property to a higher rent segment through significant planned investments, were 
especially likely to become troubled.  
 
The GSEs appear to have avoided the race to the bottom with CMBS issuers and 
depository institutions. Part of the reason may be that the GSEs, and Freddie Mac in 
particular, experienced high losses on multifamily loans in the early 1990s and therefore 
employed stricter underwriting during the lending boom. In addition, the GSEs fund 
loans either by creating a mortgage-backed security that they guarantee and then sell to 
investors, or by holding the loans in portfolio (although fewer loans are held in portfolio 
now). In either case, the GSEs face risk of loss if the borrower defaults and the proceeds 
of resolution are insufficient to repay the loan. Fannie Mae also generally shares this 
credit risk with the originating lenders, regardless of whether the loan is securitized or 
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held in portfolio, which provides an incentive to originate loans that are less likely to 
default.  
 
Other steps the GSEs have taken to reduce risk include focusing on Class A or B market-
rate properties with demonstrated ability to achieve the NOI necessary to meet the loan’s 
debt service requirements. A GSE will typically finance newly constructed properties 
only after they are fully leased up and have generated an adequate level of NOI. In 
addition, GSE loans typically have debt service coverage ratios of 1.25 or better and loan-
to-value ratios of 80 percent or less, much stricter than the underwriting standards evident 
among CMBS loans.  
 
Maturing Loan Challenges  
In recent years, it became increasingly common for apartment loans to have 25- or 30-
year amortization periods (the period over which the loan would be fully paid off) but 
maturity periods of only 5 to 10 years (the date at which the loan must be repaid). The 
advantage for the borrower comes mainly in the form of a lower interest rates. For the 
lender, a relatively short maturity minimizes the risk of undermaintenance and makes it 
easier to reassess at the time of loan renewal what to require in terms of cash reserves for 
replacements.  
 
The relatively large volume of short-term loans has raised concerns about an impending 
crisis in the multifamily market now that underwriting standards have returned to the 
normal to conservative range. Property owners may find that these loans, which were 
originated using relatively liberal underwriting standards, may be difficult to refinance 
now that both NOI and property values have fallen.  
 
The magnitude of this problem is unclear, although it appears to be most concentrated 
among CMBS and depository loans. For example, a Deutsche Bank Special Report 
(2009) estimated that about two-thirds of commercial real estate loans, including 
multifamily loans, financed with CMBS and coming due in 2009–18 would be unable to 
refinance at maturity. Based on Federal Reserve Board data, however, loans in asset-
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backed securities accounted for about 13 percent of outstanding multifamily mortgage 
debt at the start of 2010.  
 
A recent report by the Mortgage Bankers Association (2010) on the distribution of 
multifamily mortgages by year of maturity also provides insight into the potential 
magnitude of the problem. The MBA surveyed holders of commercial mortgages, 
providing fairly good coverage of loans in CMBS, held by life insurance companies, or 
owned or guaranteed by the GSEs and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), but 
did not provide information on maturities of loans owned by commercial banks and 
savings institutions. The results indicate that 15 percent of outstanding multifamily loans 
would mature between 2010 and 2012, with an additional 23 percent maturing by 2015. 
Thus, nearly two-thirds of outstanding mortgages will not come due until 2016 or later, 
including more than a quarter that will mature sometime after 2020. Loans guaranteed or 
held by the GSEs or FHA faced less maturity risk than other classes of loans, with only 
30 percent of these loans maturing before 2016.  
 
Even so, loans that do mature before then will encounter challenging market conditions 
for refinancing. Both the lender and the property owner face a high risk of loss, although 
the degree of risk varies from situation to situation. Take the example of a 200-unit 
market-rate property that was financed in 2004 using prevailing underwriting criteria 
(figure 3-6). The loan has a seven-year maturity and must be refinanced in 2011. In the 
best-case scenario (A), the outcome is what the lender and borrower had hoped for, with 
NOI growing at projected rates. The other three scenarios illustrate the increasing 
financial stress induced by lower-than-expected NOI. 
 
In the most benign scenario (B), rent growth is slower than expected, expenses higher 
than expected, and vacancy rates are elevated in 2011. The resulting NOI cannot support 
a new loan sufficient to pay off the existing debt. The borrower would likely have to sell 
the property, invest new equity capital, borrow expensive second-mortgage debt, or take 
a combination of these steps to repay the lender. Alternatively, the lender might agree to 
extend the loan. 
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In the middle scenario (C), the financial stresses from scenario (B) are exacerbated by 
greater growth in operating expenses. In this case, the borrower can only secure an 
amount well below the existing loan balance. In addition, the property value has declined 
enough that the borrower has probably been wiped out and the lender is likely to lose 
money during a foreclosure or workout process.  
 
In the worst-case scenario (D), rents have declined, expenses have increased more than 
expected, and the vacancy rate is higher in 2011. In this case, the amount the owner can 
borrow is less than half the existing loan balance, indicating that the borrower has been 
wiped out and that the lender would almost certainly suffer a large loss. 
 
Troubled Loan Resolution Process 
Owners typically stop making mortgage payments when all three of the following 
conditions have occurred: (1) NOI is inadequate to cover the mortgage payment, (2) the 
property’s reserves are inadequate to cover the mortgage payment, and (3) the owner 
cannot afford to advance funds from other sources to cover the mortgage payment. 
Several factors make it difficult to predict defaults prior to loan maturity. For example, 
owners will usually put funds into a property, even if cash flow is negative, if they 
believe there is real equity to protect. Even when there is no equity in the property, 
owners may advance funds to protect equity in other properties they own, recognizing 
that any loan default dramatically reduces the potential for future financing. Only owners 
know the amount of capital available for investment as well as the financial condition of 
the rest of their portfolios. Defaults do, however, tend to rise as a financial crisis worsens, 
with owners of large portfolios exhausting their ability to support their properties and 
defaulting on multiple loans at once. 
  
Lenders always bring in a resolution team when an owner stops making mortgage 
payments or when it becomes apparent that a short-term loan will not be repaid at 
maturity. Lenders often bring in their resolution teams even earlier, based on early 
warning systems and risk rankings. Lenders can take a variety of measures to resolve a 
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delinquency short of foreclosure, including granting temporary forbearance to borrowers 
until they can make up missed payments, modifying loan terms, and agreeing to a short 
sale or discounted payoff (see text box for description of typical resolution options). 
Lenders begin their evaluation of resolution options by looking at the causes of the 
delinquency: 
 
• a failed repositioning strategy where the property’s value is not expected to rise to 
the level hoped for when the loan was made;  
• market weakness that appears temporary where some recovery of value can 
reasonably be expected over the next few years; 
• market weakness that appears to be longer term, and so recovery of value is not 
expected for the next few years;  
• physical problems, such as a structural defect in a building’s foundation, requiring 
capital investment to correct; 
• inadequacies in management for handling the property in challenging market 
conditions; and 
• inadequacies in ownership, for example, where owners may be undermaintaining 
the property 
Another important factor in a lender’s evaluation is whether there are reasons to avoid 
assuming ownership. Those reasons might include litigation risk or liability from 
environmental contamination that requires remediation.  
If the owner and management company are found to be doing their best in a difficult 
market, the lender may pursue a resolution short of foreclosure. But if there are 
deficiencies in ownership or management, a change in ownership—forced through a 
foreclosure—may be the best option. In making this decision, lenders also consider state 
laws concerning foreclosure and receivership that make the process more or less costly. 
In addition, decisions about how and when to report the financial impact of a default and 
workout are important factors in the negotiations. For example, a liquidation approach 
usually leads quickly to definitive measurement of the lender’s loss. In a workout, 
however, the lender, its auditor, and its regulator have several decisions to make about 
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how to measure the loss and when to recognize the loss for accounting purposes (see text 
box for more on loan resolution). 
 
 
Available information about resolutions of delinquent CMBS loans suggests that the 
process often results in significant losses to lenders. For example, Real Capital Analytics 
(2010) reports recovery of between 48 cents and 69 cents on the dollar for 394 CMBS 
mortgages liquidated (foreclosed or sold) since the start of 2009 until early 2010. These 
Typical Multifamily Loan Resolution Options  
The following are the major types of resolutions for troubled multifamily loans. Some involve litigation or other 
legal action. 
Temporary forbearance. The simplest approach to resolving a delinquency is to grant the borrower a period 
of time during which partial loan payments are allowed while financial issues are addressed. The accrued 
missed payments are then made up over time through additional monthly payments.  
Loan modification. The lender and borrower agree on revised loan terms to accommodate any missed 
payments and/or to make future payments more affordable. These changes may include an extension of the 
loan term or amortization period, a change to the interest rate, or a deferral of part of the monthly payment.  
Loan sale. The lender may sell the defaulted loan, typically to a sophisticated investor who specializes in 
troubled property resolution. The sale price will typically be less than the amount of the outstanding loan 
balance and accumulated interest and fees, which may allow the purchaser more options for modifying the 
loan terms without the buyer of the loan incurring a loss. While a loan sale resolves the delinquency from the 
perspective of the lender, it does not resolve the borrower’s dilemma.  
Consensual short sale. The lender and borrower agree to sell the property to a third party for less than the 
total amount of the indebtedness with the lender receiving all or nearly all of the proceeds. The lender also 
generally agrees not to hold the borrower accountable for any losses. 
Discounted payoff. Similar to a short sale, the lender agrees to accept a payment from the borrower/owner 
that is less than the amount owed, in full satisfaction of the debt.  
Receivership. The court appoints a qualified third party, affiliated with neither the borrower nor the lender, to 
hire and oversee property management while the resolution process unfolds. Lenders often seek receivership 
at the same time they apply to foreclose to avoid the risk that the borrower may undermaintain and/or 
undermanage the property in the short term. 
Nonjudicial foreclosure. Some states allow the lender to force a foreclosure sale relatively quickly. In 
simplest terms, a nonjudicial foreclosure process does not involve the courts, provides the lender strong 
rights, and gives the borrower/owner relatively few rights. The lender does not, however, seek a deficiency 
judgment in which the borrower is personally responsible to repay the lender for any loss.  
Judicial foreclosure. Under this process, the lender and borrower/owner attempt to persuade a judge 
whether a foreclosure should or should not be allowed. In some states, this type of resolution is the only 
option available. In a judicial foreclosure, the lender intends to seek a deficiency judgment.  
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results, however, cannot be taken as a general estimate of the losses to be incurred on 
delinquent multifamily loans because the figures include commercial real estate loans of 
all sorts. More important, liquidated loans represent cases where lenders had little hope of 
recovering losses through future growth in NOI and are therefore apt to be loans on 
severely underwater properties.  
 
In cases where a workout short of foreclosure is pursued, it is impossible to assess losses 
until sometime after the workout is entered into. In their analysis, Real Capital Analytics 
estimated that a total of $7.7 billion in loans were liquidated and well over $10 billion in 
loans were resolved through workouts. Thus, a majority of delinquencies are likely to be 
resolved short of foreclosure. Lenders who pursue workouts clearly expect lower losses 
over time than they would incur through liquidation, but only time will tell whether that 
expectation is realized.  
 
Risks to Tenants 
According to interviewees, renters in multifamily properties are less at risk of eviction 
upon foreclosure than tenants of single-family rentals (which include one- to four-unit 
properties). As the single-family foreclosure crisis mushroomed in 2008, significant 
concerns were raised about the impact of the crisis on renters as a significant share of 
properties were either rented out by investors or occupied by owners and their tenants. In 
these cases, lenders routinely evicted tenants upon foreclosing on the properties to 
prepare the units for sale. These evictions often occurred with little notice, with tenants 
unaware that a foreclosure was pending. In early 2009, the National Low Income 
Housing Coalition (Pelletiere 2009) estimated that about 40 percent of households 
affected by foreclosures were renters. In May of that year, President Obama signed into 
law the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act, requiring that owners of foreclosed 
properties provide tenants at least 90 days notice before they can be evicted. If the tenant 
has a lease for a longer period, the owner must honor the lease. If the new owners intend 
to occupy the property as a primary residence, however, they can give tenants 90 days 
notice that they have to move. While not without its flaws (including a lack of direction 
regarding the nature of the notice and a lack of enforcement mechanisms), the law 
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expanded tenants’ rights and thus helped to ease concerns about the abrupt displacement 
of tenants by foreclosures.  
 
Market participants interviewed for this report thought that the increase in multifamily 
foreclosures and workouts would not result in a heightened risk of eviction for lease-
compliant tenants. Indeed, lenders or purchasers want to retain rent-paying tenants to 
maintain cash flows. But with continued high unemployment, large numbers of tenants 
are likely to have difficulty meeting their monthly rent obligations and so face a higher 
risk of eviction. While in some cases struggling homeowners can tap a number of federal 
mortgage modification programs to make their payments more affordable, there are no 
equivalent efforts to help financially distressed renters.  
 
Rather than eviction, the primary risk to tenants from the multifamily debt crisis is that 
property owners will fail to invest adequately in their buildings and that housing quality 
will decline. Rental housing relies primarily on market mechanisms to discipline owners 
to maintain their properties, with enforcement of local housing codes a secondary 
mechanism. Those interviewed for this study expressed the view that market mechanisms 
are generally quite effective: owners provide adequate maintenance because failing to do 
so makes their properties less appealing to tenants.16
 
 As a property deteriorates, good 
tenants leave and new tenants are harder to attract. In this way, owners find that the 
resulting loss of revenue overshadows any savings from reduced maintenance costs.  
But for properties at the lowest rent levels, the market mechanisms are relatively weak 
because many tenants are unable to reward better maintenance with additional rent. Rents 
tend to be marginally above the owner’s out-of-pocket costs (for example, for taxes and 
insurance), which in turn means that properties have relatively little real economic value. 
Owners of this low-end stock therefore have less incentive to invest in property 
operations and maintenance.  
                                               
16 Adequate maintenance in this context means maintenance at least good enough to keep good tenants 
from moving out. It does not denote compliance with any particular external standard, and may well be a 
lower standard than tenants prefer. Similarly, for owners who accept housing choice vouchers, failure to 
meet the Section 8 maintenance standards will lead to the loss of rent-paying tenants. 
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Moreover, if property owners have little income left after paying debt service, they may 
feel they have little choice but to reduce maintenance activities. And if the property’s 
value has dropped well below the amount of the mortgage, the owner may see no benefit 
in continuing to maintain the property but considerable advantage in reducing expenses to 
maximize short-term net operating income. Lenders that were interviewed were 
unanimous in citing undermaintenance as a sign of a bad borrower and stated that they 
would seek to remove the property from that owner’s control.  
 
Countering the incentive to manage properties for short-term gain is the risk to reputation 
from pursuing this strategy. For owners with a long-term interest in the industry, the 
decision to adequately maintain a financially stressed property is relatively easy because 
doing so preserves their chances of obtaining loans once the crisis is over.  
 
Even so, the lenders participating in this study expected that a material fraction of 
financially stressed property owners would undermaintain their properties. And the 
longer a property is in the hands of a financially strapped owner, the greater the risk that 
tenants will suffer from inadequate maintenance of that property. As result, the lenders 
argued that there is justification for a public policy to accelerate the resolution process for 
troubled rental properties.  
 
Factors Affecting the Outlook for Multifamily Finance 
Most multifamily market experts interviewed for this report expected loan delinquency 
rates to continue to rise into 2011. But they cited several factors that would influence the 
pace and form of loan resolutions—in particular, the federal government’s regulatory 
stance. In 2009, regulators did not pressure lenders to liquidate troubled loans and 
properties. As a result, most lenders took an “extend and pretend” approach (i.e., extend 
the maturity of the loan and pretend there is no problem) to help to reduce the volume of 
foreclosed rental properties. While regulators’ stances could change, there was no 
indication that this was likely at the time interviews were conducted.  
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Another factor that may help limit multifamily defaults is that many owners refinanced 
during the recent lending boom and took out large amounts of equity in cash. If those 
loans are now in trouble, the owners may still be able to support their loans rather than 
default. In contrast, owners who purchased properties in the early to mid-2000s may be 
less able to repay their troubled loans.  
 
Interviewees also pointed to signs that the rental market was beginning to recover even as 
of mid-2010, although it was too soon to tell how strong and sustainable the rebound 
would be. Since the interviews were conducted, vacancy rates have eased from their 
record highs, while rents are recovering. But given that the rental sector is fundamentally 
tied to job growth and consumer confidence, its recovery depends on avoiding a double-
dip recession and on restoring labor markets. 
 
On the positive side, while there was overlending on multifamily properties in the early 
to mid-2000s, interviewees felt that there was no overbuilding. Moreover, prospects for 
renter household growth are bright over the next several years as the echo-boom 
generation ages into prime household formation years and declining homeownership rates 
have not yet bottomed out. Interviewees generally expect the current surplus of single-
family homes for sale or for rent will be absorbed over the next few years, bringing rental 
vacancy rates down from current highs.  
 
One of the lessons from the multifamily loan crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s is 
that current conditions provide an opportunity to create large pools of capital to acquire 
troubled loans and properties. Because the prior crisis was followed by an extended 
period of strong multifamily performance, many industry participants expect a similar 
recovery. Indeed, interviewees reported that a large stock of capital is available for equity 
and debt investment, although lenders are targeting high-quality properties in well-above-
average markets, at prices reflecting today’s lower levels of NOI. At the same time, the 
financing environment for less attractive multifamily properties and those located outside 
of select large markets will likely remain difficult.  
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4. Summary  
 
The Great Recession brought new financial stress to renter households and rental 
property owners alike. Although the economic downturn brought rent and energy price 
increases to a halt, renters’ incomes fell even more sharply. As a result, the plight of low-
income renters has only worsened—not just in the past two years but over the decade as a 
whole. Indeed, by virtually every measure, rental affordability has been on the decline 
since at least 1960. During times of economic growth rental affordability generally 
improves as renters incomes rise, with much of these gains then given back during 
subsequent recessions. In keeping with this pattern, the current recession has resulted in 
an increase in renters’ cost burdens, but this time it has come on the heels of a decade that 
was already marked by the worst deterioration in rental housing affordability since the 
1970s. As a result, in 2009, both the number and share of severely cost-burdened renters 
reached new highs. Adding to the pressures, the limited supply of rental housing 
affordable and available to these households continues to shrink. Record-high vacancy 
rates have done nothing to narrow this supply gap as broad measures of rental costs have 
not declined. Moreover, the affordability crisis is evident in all major housing markets of 
the country.  
 
Many multifamily property owners are struggling as well, particularly those with lower-
grade units so essential to meet the needs of lowest-income renters. With the recession-
induced weakness in rents and declines in property values, these owners lack the cash 
flows to invest in the upkeep of their buildings. Undermaintenance will lead to additional 
losses from the already limited stock of affordable housing. 
 
For owners of higher-grade properties, the challenge is to refinance their loans under 
today’s stricter guidelines. Many loans originated during the multifamily market boom 
were based on lax underwriting standards and overly optimistic income projections. Now 
that property values have dropped and cash flows are constrained, loan delinquencies are 
on the rise. Defaults on loans held in commercial mortgage backed securities are 
especially high, although those held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac remain very low.  
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Lenders are keeping a watchful eye on multifamily loans to initiate a resolution process 
as soon as financial difficulties are evident. The workout options are similar to those in 
the single-family mortgage market, ranging from forbearance and loan modifications to 
provide owners with time to recover from their financial distress, to short sales and 
foreclosures. Owners of portfolios of multifamily properties are particularly motivated to 
work with lenders since foreclosure would limit their ability to secure financing in the 
future.  
 
Moreover, interviewees for this report indicated that lease-compliant residents of 
distressed properties are unlikely to be evicted, given that both lenders and owners want 
to retain good tenants. Noncompliant renters may, however, be at increased risk of 
eviction once normal property management standards are enforced. A greater threat to 
tenants, however, is that cash-strapped owners will not adequately maintain their 
properties and thus reduce quality of life for residents. 
 
On the positive side, many interviewees felt that the market had bottomed out, which has 
been borne out by positive trends in a number of market indicators. Indeed, investors and 
lenders were becoming more active in the strongest market segments, primarily high-end 
properties in major metropolitan areas. Nevertheless, interviewees also expected 
multifamily loan delinquencies to remain high as difficult financing conditions take their 
toll on poorly positioned properties. 
 
In the longer run, demographic forces provide reasons for rental property owners to be 
optimistic about the future. The aging of the echo boom generation into the prime 
household formation years should give renter household growth a significant boost. 
While the recession has reduced the number of young adults forming independent 
households as well as the net flow of immigrants into the country, the economic recovery 
could release pent-up demand that could quickly turn the rental supply from excessive to 
inadequate. The wildcard is whether homeownership rates will continue to fall, propping 
up the flow of single-family homes into the rental market. But declining homeownership  
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rates would also bring additional households into the rental market along with these units. 
For this reason, new formation of renter households is likely to hold the key to future 
demand for rental housing production.  
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Appendix A. Data Sources 
 
American Community Survey 
The Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS) has collected information 
from about 3 million households each year since 2005 and collected from a smaller 
sample in the earlier years of the decade. The large sample size allows analysis at the 
state and local level, and the inclusion of data on rents, utilities, and housing 
characteristics, along with demographic and income information, is suited to the analysis 
of affordability. 
 
The Minnesota Population Center Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) data 
used in Joint Center tabulations is based on ACS samples deliberately rendered imprecise 
by the Census Bureau to protect the confidentiality of respondents. Only about 40 percent 
of the ACS responses are included in the data, and the only geographic identification is 
by state and public use microdata area (PUMA). The PUMAs are areas with at least 
100,000 population, created for the 2000 Census in consultation with state officials. 
Some PUMAs are not fully contained in metropolitan areas. To estimate data for 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) that include partial PUMAs, records from those 
PUMAs were included in the MSA estimates but were given reduced weights reflecting 
the share of the PUMA population that was in the MSA in 2009. Of the 100 MSAs in this 
analysis, 64 included some cross-border PUMAs, although the share of population in 
those MSAs that was in cross-border PUMAs averaged only 9.6 percent. The MSA with 
the largest share of its population in PUMAs that were not fully contained within the 
MSA was Worcester, Massachusetts, with 61.9 percent. 
The Census Bureau reports some information for MSAs based on the complete set of 
responses and actual addresses. Comparisons of the Joint Center estimates produced from 
the microdata with the data reported by the Census Bureau illustrate the differences due 
to sampling and the process of aggregating PUMAs to MSAs. For the 36 MSAs that 
include only whole PUMAs, the total counts of households in the Joint Center estimates 
match Census estimates almost exactly since the weights were constructed so that the 
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PUMA data would match the complete sample. However, other variables, such as median 
rent and income, will differ to a greater extent. The 64 MSAs with cross-border PUMAs 
have larger differences from published tables, but differ by an average of only 0.5 percent 
from Census Bureau estimates of total household counts by MSA.  
Other potential methods for estimating data for MSAs that include parts of PUMAs may 
include (1) incorporating cross-border PUMAs in their entirety, which will consistently 
overstate the number of households within each MSA; (2) excluding cross-border 
PUMAs entirely, which will consistently understate the number of households within 
each MSA; or (3) excluding cross-border PUMAs with less than 50 percent of population 
within the MSA, and including all records from PUMAs with more than 50 percent of 
their population inside the MSA. The third alternative is a reasonable approximation, but 
tests, and logic, indicate that this produces numbers that are further from the estimates 
calculated by the Census Bureau from the full ACS sample using nonpublic information 
on location than the estimates based on the reweighting of records used in our 
calculations.  
Although the ACS data are an invaluable resource, especially for analysis at the MSA 
level, some aspects of the way the survey is conducted lead to inconsistencies with data 
from other surveys and/or with conceptual parameters for measuring incomes, rents, and 
housing supply. 
 
Unlike other surveys that measure occupancy of a housing unit based on whether it was a 
usual or primary residence at a given point in time, the ACS counts units as occupied if 
someone is living there at the time he is initially contacted or when subsequent inquiries 
are made over a period of three months, provided that the occupant has been there for two 
months or expects to be there for two months, even though it is not his usual residence. 
This count of “current residents” leads to a reduced count of vacancies and higher 
numbers for occupied units, mainly appearing as more renter-occupied units. 
 
The ACS is conducted throughout the year and information is collected about income 
received “during the past 12 months.” Respondents surveyed in the early months of the 
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year are mainly reporting income in the preceding year. Thus the ACS income data for 
2009 represent a weighted average of 2008 and 2009, with most of the weight on the 
latter months of 2008 and the early months of 2009. An adjustment for inflation over the 
course of the year is incorporated in the reported income, but no adjustment is made for 
subsequent economic trends. 
 
For occupied rental units, the ACS collects information on the cost of utilities in the most 
recent month, as well as monthly rent, allowing a gross rent to be reported. Rent data are 
also collected for vacant units that are on the market for rent or that have been rented but 
not yet occupied, but those values do not include the cost of utilities that would be paid 
by an occupant. 
 
Current Population Survey/Housing Vacancy Survey 
The Current Population Survey (CPS) has been conducted monthly since 1947, mainly to 
collect information about labor force participation and unemployment. Vacant units 
encountered in the CPS constitute the Housing Vacancy Survey (HVS). For vacant units, 
information is collected about type of vacancy (for rent, for sale, for occasional use, etc.), 
type of structure, year built, and, in the case of vacant units for rent, the asking rent. For 
occupied units, tenure information is obtained but not rent or year built, and information 
regarding units in structure is incomplete and unreliable. 
 
Additional information is collected in the CPS during February to April of each year from 
about 100,000 distinct housing units. It asks about income in the preceding calendar year, 
just after people receive W2 and 1099 forms and may be preparing their tax returns. This 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC)17
                                               
17 The supplement was previously only included in March, and is still often referred to as the “March 
supplement.” 
 includes detailed questions about 
income received during the previous calendar year. It is thus a better-defined, and 
probably more accurate, measure of annual household income than the ACS, but there is 
no corresponding information on rents, and the sample size is not adequate for much 
analysis at the MSA level. 
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The CPS is generally considered to be the best income measure among those used in this 
report. The Census Bureau describes the CPS as “the preferred source for national 
analysis”18
 
 in a comparison of surveys that includes the ACS and ignores the American 
Housing Survey (AHS). The CPS asks more questions about income, in a more consistent 
manner, than either the ACS or AHS. Over the past decade, the income questions in the 
AHS and employment questions in the ACS were revised, bringing the results of those 
surveys more in line with the CPS but complicating comparisons with previous data. 
The ACS generally shows higher income than the AHS, even without an adjustment for 
intrayear inflation that adds a percent or two to the income values. The ACS, however, 
also shows higher gross rents despite the more detailed questions in the AHS (Schwartz 
(2009).  
 
American Housing Survey 
The American Housing Survey (AHS) is conducted nationwide every two years and 
collects very detailed information about housing units, as well as information about the 
households living in them. The same housing units are included each time, with newly 
built housing added, so that it is possible to study changes in the use of the stock over 
time. The national survey includes about 50,000 interviews and in recent cycles has been 
conducted from April to September. 
 
The AHS does not provide a basis for much analysis at the local level,19
 
 but the national 
data files include information about HUD estimates of median family income and fair 
market rent in the area where each sample unit is located, allowing national tabulations 
based on relationships to local incomes and rents rather than only relative to national 
medians.  
                                               
18 http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/method/guidance/index.html. 
19 There are also surveys of a limited number of metropolitan areas using a higher sampling rate, conducted 
on a rotating basis. The metropolitan-area AHS data are not included in this analysis.  
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The AHS also collects information from households regarding housing subsidies, 
although the responses may not accurately identify subsidized units. The survey results 
indicate, for example, that there are almost twice as many public housing units as actually 
exist. 
 
The AHS data have generally shown lower income levels than other surveys (Susin 
2007). In 2005 and 2007 the questions regarding income were revised, in a (largely 
unsuccessful) effort to reduce the extent to which income was understated in the AHS, 
relative to other surveys. Like the ACS, the AHS asks about income in the previous 12 
months. 
 
The HUD estimates of local area median family income that are included in the AHS 
files and that were used to determine eligibility and level of benefits for assisted housing 
were calculated differently in different years, somewhat distorting comparisons over 
time. For example, the HUD estimates of median family income were virtually 
unchanged, on average, from 2005 to 2007, even though ACS, AHS, and CPS data 
showed increases of 9.6 percent, 8.0 percent, and 9.2 percent, respectively, for national 
nominal median family income. That had the effect in the AHS data and in HUD’s Worst 
Case Needs reports of identifying substantially fewer households with incomes below 30 
percent of median in 2007 than in 2005. 
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Appendix B. The Evolution of Affordability Standards 
 
Paying 30 percent of income for rent and utilities has been the affordability standard for 
federal housing programs since 1981. The 30 percent standard for HUD subsidy 
programs was included in the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act. Before then, a 
standard of 25 percent was used, reflecting a 19th century rule of thumb suggesting “a 
week’s wages for a month’s rent.” The 25 percent standard was established by the 1968 
Brooke Amendment. Feins and Lane (1981) report that “In the late 1880s the well-known 
saying ‘a week’s wages for a month's rent’ accurately described the housing expenses of 
many tenants.” They cite a number of studies and sources, many of which indicate higher 
rent-to-income ratios for lower-income households than for higher-income households. 
Hulchanski (1995) reviews many of the same sources and others and expresses somewhat 
greater skepticism regarding the accuracy and consistency of this relationship. Crawford 
(1992), discussing the life of mill workers in the 1890s, writes, “New England textile 
workers usually paid a week’s wages per month for housing, in comparison to the one- or 
two-days’ wages paid by Southerners.” Riis (1890), however, said that in New York “the 
rent ... is never less than one week’s wages out of four.” Whitaker and his coauthors 
(1918) state that “it is generally accepted that not more than 20 percent of a family’s 
income should go for rent.”  
 
Several analyses have questioned the use of the ratio of gross rent to income, the use of 
30 percent as a benchmark for that ratio, and the measures used for income and expense. 
Some argue that any given ratio of rent to income represents a more severe burden for 
some households than for others. They suggest a measure based on the income left after 
paying for housing, taking into account the costs that residual income must cover (Stone 
2006). Others have questioned the exclusion of some cash and noncash receipts in the 
measure of income (Koebel and Renneckar 2003; Stegman, Davis, and Quercia 2003). 
Still others have suggested that costs such as transportation be considered along with 
space rent and utilities in the definition of housing expense (Haas et al. 2006; Lipman 
2006). 
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In its 1994 inaugural “Worst Case Needs” report to Congress, HUD focused on renters 
spending more than half of their incomes on housing, as well as those living in severely 
inadequate units. HUD referred to renters paying more than 30 percent of income as 
having housing cost burdens, and those paying more than 50 percent as having severe 
housing cost burdens. For the most part, the analysis of affordability in this report relies 
on the 30 percent rent-to-income standard and traditional measures of money income and 
gross rent, in order to allow comparisons with many previous reports.  
 
Figure 2-1 Renter Incomes Have Lagged the Rise in Rents and Fuel and Utility Costs .             
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Figure 2-2. Real Income Drops Since the 2001 Peak Have Been Widespread
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Figure 2-3. Especially for Low Income Renters, Utilities Are a Growing Share of Housing Costs
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Figure 2-4 By All Measures Rental Affordability Has Worsened Dramatically Over the Last Half Century .             
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Figure 2-5. The Situation for the Lowest Income Renters Is Increasingly Dire and Affordability Problems Are Creeping Up the 
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Economic Perspectives  18(1).
Figure 2-6. Affordability Worsened as Rents Rose and Real Incomes Fell 
in the 1970s and 2000s 
Notes: Decomposition of the change in affordability from 1960 to 2000 is 
from Quigley and Raphael (2004). The change in 2000-9 is estimated 
using the same methodology.
 Figure 2-7. The Number of Renters Needing Assistance Increased Sharply During the Financial Crisis Yet Only a Fraction of Those Eligible for Help Received It, and Even With Assistance Many 
Still Faced Severe Housing Problems 
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Source: JCHS tabulations of the 2007 and 2009 American Housing Surveys, using JCHS-adjusted weights.
Notes: Very low income (VLI) renters have pre-tax household incomes that are less than 50 percent of HUD-defined area median family income, adjusted for family size. Renters with severe 
housing problems pay half or more of household income for rent and utilities or live in severely inadequate units. Renters with moderate housing problems pay between 30 and 50 percent of income 
for rent and utlities, live in moderately inadequate units, or are overcrowded, having more than one person per room. Standards for moderate and severe inadequacy are defined by HUD. Renters 
with zero or negative income are assumed to be severely burdened, while no cash renters are assumed to be unburdened. Renters with zero or negative income paying more than the fair market 
rent and living in adequate units are imputed to have above median income. 
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Figure 2-8. The Number of HUD-Assisted Renters Has Not Grown Since the 1990s
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Notes: Households with more than one form of rental subsidy are counted more than once. Estimates after 1999 are from HUD 
performance and accountability reports. 
Sources: US House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 2000 Green Book; US Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Performance and Accountablity Reports 2003-9. 
Figure 2-9. Renter Cost Burdens Vary by Metro, but All Saw Signficant Increases in Severe Burdens 
This Decade
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Source: JCHS tabulations of US Census Bureau, 2000 and 2009 American Community Surveys.
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Figure 2-10. Very Few Rental Units Are Available and Affordable to the Lowest Income Renters
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Rental Units As a Share of Renter Households in 2009 (Percent)
Source: JCHS tabulations of US Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2009 American Housing Survey, using 
JCHS-adjusted weights.
Notes: Affordable units have gross rents that are no more than 30% of the maximum income for the income category, 
adjusted for number of bedrooms. Available units are vacant or occupied by renters with incomes that are no more than the 
maximum for the category. Adequate units exclude occupied units that are severely inadequate according to HUD standards, 
and vacant units that lack full plumbing. Gross rent for vacant units is estimated at 1.15 times the asking rent. Local area 
median income is determined by HUD and is adjusted for family size. Units rented but not yet occupied are excluded.
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Figure 2-11. As the Number of Low Income Renters Grew, the Number of Affordable and Available Units Shrank
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Source: JCHS tabulations of US Department of Housing and Urban Development 2009 American Housing Survey
adjusted for number of bedrooms. Available units are vacant or occupied by renters with incomes that are no more 
than the maximum for the category. Adequate units exclude occupied units that are severely inadequate according to 
HUD standards, and vacant units that lack full plumbing. Gross rent for vacant units is estimated at 1.15 times the 
asking rent. Local area median income is determined by HUD and is adjusted for family size. Units rented but not yet 
occupied are excluded.
          ,    , 
using JCHS-adjusted weights.
Figure 3-1. Prices Started Falling Later for Multifamily Properties Than Single Family Homes, But the 
Magnitude of the Boom and Bust Was Similar
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Notes: Data are normalized to 100 in 2000:4. Single family index is based on sales of 1-4 unit properties. 
Multifamily index is based on sales of multifamily apartment properties worth at least $2.5 million. 
Sources: Moody's/REAL National Commercial Property Price Index for Apartments; S&P/Case-Shiller 
National Home Price Index.
Figure 3-2. Multifamily Lending Grew Substantially Beginning in 1998
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Note: Values are adjusted for inflation using quarterly averages of the monthly CPI-U for All Items.
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds.
Figure 3-3. The GSEs, Commercial Banks, and Asset-Backed Securities Accounted for Most of the Boom in Multifamily Lending
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Note: Values are adjusted for inflation using the fourth-quarter average of the monthly CPI-U for All Items.
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds.
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Figure 3-4. Vacancy Rates Rose Sharply in 2009, Particularly Among Larger Buildings, and then Retreated in 2010
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Figure 3-5. Multifamily Delinquencies Are Worst for Loans in Private Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities
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sold. Delinquency rates are the share of loans by volume that are 60 or more days delinquent, except for banks and thrifts, which are the share 
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Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Survey and Commercial/Multifamily Mortgage Delinquency Rates; Moody's 
Multifamily CMBS Delinquency Tracker; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Quarterly Loan Portfolio Performance Indicators.
Figure 3-6. Short Term Loans Originated During the Boom Years May Have Difficulty Meeting Underwriting Criteria for Refinancing 
Refinancing Scenarios for a Hypothetical 200-Unit Market-Rate Apartment Property Financed in 2004, with Loan Maturing in 2011
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Notes:  DSCR at loan origination in 2004 = 1.15. Alternative scenarios for refinancing also assume that a DSCR of 1.15. 
Scenario A:  This illustrates the scenario projected at the time of loan origination calling for strong growth in NOI resulting in DSCR of 1.37, enabling 
the owner to refinance at a higher loan amount. Scenario B:  2011 rents are 1% per year (compounded) above 2004 pro forma levels; expenses are 
5% per year (compounded) above 2004 pro forma levels; and there is a 9% rent loss in 2011 due to high vacancies. DSCR on the existing loan in 
2011 would be 0.98. Scenario C:  2011 rents are negative 1% per year (compounded) below pro forma levels; 2011 expenses are 5% per year 
(compounded) above pro forma levels; and there is 9% rent loss due to high vacancies. DSCR would be 0.76. Scenario D: 2011 rents are negative 
2% per year (compounded) below pro forma levels; 2011 expenses are 7% per year (compounded) above pro forma levels; and there is 11% rent 
loss in 2011 due to high vacancies. DSCR would be 0.52.
